For Emmanuel Levinas the foundation of the moral “ought” is an important question. He is skeptical, however, about using human reason or any sort of metaphysics to ground ethics. Instead he resorts to the human face as to what motivates a person to act ethically toward another person. Levinas argues that it is the nature of the human face to oblige anyone to act in an ethical way. In short, the human face commands one to be ethical. I will argue (...) that the metaphysics of being according to W. Norris Clarke and Jacques Maritain provide a corrective to Levinas’s metaphysical skepticism. Using Clarke’s metaphysics of person as the fullest expression of what it means to be, I maintain that what shines forth in the human face is the very depths of the human person. What grounds the ethical “ought” is the person. The human face is only the surface through which a deeper reality resonates. In this way, I argue for a metaphysical foundation for ethics. (shrink)

This article argues that Maritain’s philosophy of human intellection was more indebted to Bergson’s views on the centrality of intuition, metaphysics, andthe instrumental character of scientific reason, than some of Maritain’s published criticisms of Bergson might lead one to believe. Toward the end of his life Maritain spoke of twentieth-century Thomism’s debt to Bergson.

This article argues that Maritain’s philosophy of human intellection was more indebted to Bergson’s views on the centrality of intuition, metaphysics, andthe instrumental character of scientific reason, than some of Maritain’s published criticisms of Bergson might lead one to believe. Toward the end of his life Maritain spoke of twentieth-century Thomism’s debt to Bergson.